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Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant Google LLC 
(“Google”) respectfully moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted.  This motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Attorney General Mark Brnovich (the “AG”) brings this action under a statute that 
seeks to protect Arizona consumers from being lured into purchases on the basis of 
misrepresentations.  But the Complaint concerns all but consumer fraud.  The only products 
Google allegedly sold to Arizona consumers are smartphones, and the Complaint fails to 
allege a single deceptive practice connected to those sales. 
The AG promises the Arizona public that he will “enforce the law as it is, not as you 
want it to be.” 1  Yet by filing this action, the AG seeks to unilaterally amend the state’s 
consumer-fraud statute, morphing it into the kind of privacy legislation now under 
consideration by the legislators Arizonans elected. 
The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (“ACFA”) regulates deceptive practices in 
connection with the sale of merchandise in Arizona.  The Complaint alleges no such thing.  
Apparently aware that he has not identified any misrepresentation connected to the sale or 
advertisement of a Google smartphone, the AG also alleges Google has deceived consumers 
through the “sale” of items such as its apps, operating system and Chrome browser.  But 
those products are not sold to Arizona consumers as the statute requires; they are free.  
Finally, the AG attacks Google’s offer of an ad platform to businesses and others who 
advertise through Google.  Yet he fails to allege that any buyers of ad placements were 
deceived in any way, let alone that they are Arizona consumers.  Finally, the scope of the 
                                                 
1 Maria Polletta, Arizona’s Attorney General Race Has Drawn National Attention. Here’s 




































claim is limited by the AFCA’s one-year statute of limitations, and thus any surviving claim 
should be substantially curtailed. 
Accordingly, this Court should enforce the law as it is—not as the AG wants to 
rewrite it—and dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under the ACFA. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Google is a technology company recognized for a broad range of products and 
services, including its well-known search engine and services.  Compl. ¶ 15.2  Millions of 
individuals worldwide, including those in Arizona, rely on Google’s products and services on 
a daily basis.  Id. ¶ 10.  Google takes their trust seriously.  Even as it continues to develop an 
expanding range of services for users, Google has fostered an open, self-critical internal 
environment that respects its users and continuously seeks to improve their experience.  This 
process drives the innovation users expect from Google. 
A. Google’s Products and Services 
Google offers popular services such as Google Search, Maps, YouTube, various 
Google apps, the Chrome browser and the Android operating system, all for free.  Compl. 
¶ 2.  Additionally, Google has offered tangible devices such as the Google Pixel and Google 
Nexus phone families.  Id. ¶ 23. 
Each of Google’s mobile telephone devices comes with the Android operating system 
and Google’s proprietary suite of apps installed prior to the user’s purchase.  Id. ¶¶ 24, 27.  
Android is also a popular operating system among third-party device manufacturers 
(“OEMs”), such as Samsung.  Id.  Because the Android operating system is freely available, 
open-source software, OEMs are able to alter the version of Android they choose to install 
on a device.  Id. ¶¶ 28–29.  Many OEMs prefer to install Google’s licensed version of 
Android, however, which contains the full suite of Google apps, collectively called “Google 
Mobile Services.”  Id. ¶ 30. 
                                                 
2 Google draws these facts from the Complaint and the documents attached thereto.  
Although Google contests many of these allegations, Google treats them as true for purposes 


































B. Location Data 
It is no secret that many of Google’s apps and services rely on user location data.  
Google makes this clear through numerous disclosures and within Google’s apps and services 
themselves.  Indeed, Google Maps can provide navigation only if it knows where the user is 
in real time.  See Compl. ¶ 80.  But navigation is not the only context in which users find it 
useful to allow Google to use their location data.  Location data is critical to helping users 
locate nearby services they are searching for, id. ¶ 38, choosing to share real-time location 
with loved ones, id., filtering out advertisements from geographically distant merchants, id. 
¶ 97, locating the nearest WiFi access point, id. ¶ 72, and countless other uses as varied as 
finding a date or the nearest bus stop. 
The Complaint identifies Google’s location settings at three levels: (i) account-level, 
(ii) device-level, and (iii) app-level.  Id. ¶ 34.  Account-level settings allow users to make 
changes to their Google account.  Id. ¶ 36.  Device-level settings are specific to a device.  Id. 
¶ 35.  App-level settings allow users to make changes relating to a specific Google App, 
which do not impact a particular device or account.  Id. ¶ 37. 
Device level.  The most precise source of location information can be a device’s GPS 
function, which uses satellite data to pinpoint a device’s location.  See id. ¶ 38.  WiFi access 
points may provide another means of supplementing location data.  See id.  The AG refers to 
these functions as “Device Location” or the “Location Master.”  See id.  Users with Location 
Master turned on for their device may also separately choose whether to allow Google to 
estimate the device’s location based on WiFi access points near the device.  See id. ¶ 72.  The 
WiFi Scanning functionality permits users to scan for nearby networks and their comparative 
strength.  It may be used to help infer their location in relation to those access points, which 
can supplement the device’s GPS data.  Id. ¶¶ 38, 71 n.7, 72.  Finally, IP addresses provide 
another method of inferring a device’s general location.  Like phone numbers or postal codes, 
IP addresses are assigned in blocks to geographic areas.  Id. ¶ 90. 
Account level.  For Google account holders who have opted into the Location 


































a history of where they have been with their opted-in devices.  Id. ¶ 38.  And where users 
keep Web & App Activity (“WAA”) enabled, user location is used to provide the most 
relevant responses to user queries (e.g., searching “restaurants near me”).  See id. ¶¶ 38, 61.  
Although Supplemental Web & App Activity (“sWAA”) is an additional setting identified in 
the Complaint, it is not alleged to collect location data.  See id. ¶¶ 38, 106 n.13, 61 (alleging 
sWAA collects Chrome, website, and app data). 
App level.  App-level settings allow users to make changes relating to a specific 
Google App, which do not impact a particular device or account.  Id. ¶ 37. 
C. Google’s Privacy Policy 
The AG attaches Google’s Privacy Policy to his Complaint.  There, Google publicly 
discloses these sources of location data, as well as how it uses location data.  Compl. Ex. 72 
(GOOG-GLAZ-00000718).  Google plainly discloses that “we collect information about 
your location when you use our services, which helps us offer features like driving directions 
for your weekend getaway or showtimes for movies playing near you.”  Id.  The policy also 
describes how a user’s “location can be determined with varying degrees of accuracy” 
depending on the source.  Id.  The policy clearly informs the reader that Google may use a 
device’s GPS, IP address, “[s]ensor data from [a] device,” and “[i]nformation about things 
near [a] device, such as Wi-Fi access points, cell towers, and Bluetooth-enabled devices.”  Id.  
Google also explains why it may use these features: to provide services and fulfill user queries, 
to improve existing services and develop new ones, and to personalize user experience—
which includes personalizing advertisements.  Id. (GOOG-GLAZ-00000719–20). 
D. Google Ad Services 
Google offers many of its products and services to users free of charge, supported by 
ad revenue.  Compl. ¶ 26.  One of the ways Google improves the ads a user sees is by 
offering the option to see personalized ads based on the user’s inferred interests though the 
Google Ads Personalization setting.  See id.  The AG suggests that this setting principally 
concerns location data.  See id. ¶ 38.  It does not.  As explained in Google’s privacy policy, Ad 


































they may be interested in.  Id. ¶ 97, Ex. 245 (GOOG-GLAZ-00000719).  For example, if a 
user has been actively using Google to search for and experience content related to mountain 
bikes, Ads Personalization would promote advertisements for mountain bikes rather than 
irrelevant products that are of no assistance to the user.  See id.  Google also offers ad services 
to retailers.  Id. ¶ 6.  The retailers selling mountain bikes use Google’s ad services to place ads 
on Google apps and websites.  Id. ¶ 9(e).  If a user disables the Google Ads Personalization 
setting, they will see ads based on their current search or unidentified browser characteristics. 
E. The Attorney General’s Allegations 
After a lengthy investigation, the AG brought this action asserting a single cause of 
action under the ACFA, which forbids the use of deceptive or unfair acts in connection with 
the sale or advertisement of merchandise.  A.R.S. § 44-1522(A). 
The AG’s allegations center on Google’s clearly and accurately disclosed use and 
collection of users’ location data in free products, rather than any deceptive statements or 
practices in the sale or advertisement of Google’s products and services.  See Compl. ¶ 161.  
Without pointing to any specific deception, the AG vaguely contends that Google confuses 
users about what location data it collects through various apps, settings and web searches. Id. 
¶¶ 42–49.  Despite the one-year statute of limitations, the AG’s investigation covers irrelevant 
disclosures over the course of more than 10 years.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 23 (identifying device 
released January 2010), 135 (discussing 2012 communications regarding prior version of 
Android), 113 (discussing changes to version of Android released in 2013).  The AG does not 
specify which challenged practice was in place at any given time, what made the practice 
deceptive at that time and what “sale or advertisement of merchandise” is connected to the 
so-called deception.  See id. 
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion to Dismiss 
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12, only well-
pled factual allegations enjoy the presumption of truth; “mere conclusory statements are 


































consisting of conclusions of law, inferences or deductions that are not necessarily implied by 
well-pleaded facts, unreasonable inferences or unsupported conclusions from such facts, or 
legal conclusions alleged as facts.”  Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, 389 (App. 2005). 
Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges misrepresentations or fraud, his pleadings are 
subjected to a heightened pleading standard.  Ariz. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. 
Cty. of Maricopa, 234 Ariz. 125, 141 (App. 2014) (affirming dismissal of ACFA claim for failure 
to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement).  The plaintiff must allege with specificity “‘the 
who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”  Grismore v. Capital One Fin. 
Servs. Corp., No. CV-05-2460-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 8440793, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2006) 
(dismissing ACFA claim). 
B. The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act 
In 1967, the Arizona Legislature passed H.B. 114 to enact the ACFA.  According to 
Attorney General Darrell Smith, who testified in favor of H.B. 114 before the House 
Committee on Commerce and Industry, the law sought “to stop the fraud that now exists in 
the selling of many goods to the consumer . . . .”  Hearing on H.B. 114 Before the H. Comm. on 
Commerce & Indus., 28th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. Feb. 8, 1967).  Since that time, courts have 
continued to recognize that the central purpose of the ACFA is “to provide injured 
consumers with a remedy to counteract the disproportionate bargaining power often present 
in consumer transactions.”  Waste Mfg. & Leasing Corp. v. Hambicki, 183 Ariz. 84, 88 (App. 
1995). 
While the ACFA is broad, it does not purport to govern all consumer relations.  The 
power to further regulate other aspects of commercial relationships, particularly in the realm 
of consumer privacy, remains with the Legislature.  And, as it happens, the Legislature is 
currently considering two bills that could govern the collection and handling of users’ 
geolocation data if enacted.  Both H.B. 2729 and S.B. 1614, currently pending before the 
Legislature, govern consumer personal data, including location data.  H.B. 2729 & S.B. 1614, 
54th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2020).  Each bill mandates particular disclosures and processes for 



































To state a claim under the ACFA, the AG must show (1) a deceptive or unfair act or 
practice, or an omission of material fact with intent for a consumer to rely thereon; (2) in 
connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise.  A.R.S. § 44-1522(A).  While the 
AG goes to great lengths to create the illusion of deceptive conduct, he fails to show any 
such deception or any connection to the sale of merchandise.  The only merchandise the AG 
alleges Google sold or advertised to Arizona consumers are the Nexus and Pixel smartphones.  
There are, however, no allegations remotely suggesting that any of the conduct alleged in the 
Complaint induced any Arizona consumer to buy a Nexus or Pixel smartphone.  For example, 
there are no allegations that the battery does not last as long as advertised or that the camera’s 
lenses fall short of the identified specifications.  Instead, the AG’s Complaint compiles a 
patchwork of alleged statements that have nothing to do with deceiving an Arizona consumer 
into buying anything. 
Setting aside these mischaracterizations of Google’s business practices, the ACFA 
simply does not cover post-sale conduct like software updates or a user’s app usage.  Even 
assuming the ACFA covered this conduct, the AG’s allegations—which are an 
undifferentiated amalgamation of matters spanning 10 years—fall well outside the one-year 
limitations period. 
A. The Only Merchandise “Sold” or “Advertised” to Arizona Consumers 
were the Nexus and Pixel Smartphones 
The ACFA concerns only deceptive or unfair practices occurring in connection with 
the sale or advertisement of merchandise.  A.R.S. § 44-1522(A).  The only merchandise alleged to 
have been sold by Google to an Arizona consumer are Google Nexus and Pixel smartphones.   
Besides Google smartphones, the Complaint identifies as merchandise (1) free items 
(apps, websites, Google Accounts, Google Chrome, and the Android operating system (“Free 


































ACFA were broad enough to encompass each of these items,3 see A.R.S. § 44-1521(5), none 
of these things were “sold” within the meaning of the statute. 
1. The Complaint Alleges No “Sale” of the Free Items 
The ACFA defines a “sale” as “any sale, offer for sale or attempt to sell any 
merchandise for any consideration . . . .”  A.R.S. § 44-1521(7).  The Complaint alleges, 
however, that users do not buy Google’s Apps, Chrome or the Android operating system.  
Compl. ¶ 26 (noting that Google software is free to users).  There is no sale. 
Recognizing that a user does not purchase any of these Free Items, and that there is 
no “sale” within the meaning of the statute, the AG asserts that users provide their location 
data as consideration for the use of Google software and websites and that therefore these 
free items are “sold.”  Compl. ¶ 26.  As a legal matter, there are at least two fatal flaws with 
this approach.  First, even if the AG properly alleged consideration—which he does not—
consideration alone is not enough.  There must still be a sale under the statute.  Not every 
exchange supported by consideration is a “sale.”  A.R.S. § 44-1521(7); see also, e.g., Demasse v. 
ITT Corp., 194 Ariz. 500, 507 (1999) (analyzing consideration for contract of employment); 
Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 150 Ariz. 510, 516 (App. 1986) (noting importance of 
consideration in covenant not to compete).  Second, the allegation that users exchange location 
data for the Free Items flies in the face of the AG’s contention that Google users do not 
know Google collects their location data.  To the extent that the AG does allege that a user 
has bargained with Google by agreeing to give it her location data, she has consented to 
Google’s collection of the data and cannot have been deceived.  If the user can choose not to 
provide Google with location data, as the AG also alleges (e.g., ¶ 38), then it is not valid 
consideration.  Valdiviezo v. Phelps Dodge Hidalgo Smelter, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 1060, 1066 D. Ariz. 
1997) (“A contract is not supported by consideration where one of the parties has made . . . a 
promise that leaves the choice of performance entirely to the promisor.”).  Either there was 
no consideration, or there was no deception.  The AG cannot have it both ways. 
                                                 
3 For example, “Google Accounts” are merely antecedent to accessing Google 


































2. The Complaint Alleges No Sale of Ads to Arizona Consumers 
The only sales alleged with any clarity—to say nothing of the specificity Rule 9(b) 
requires—concern Android devices (e.g., Nexus and Pixel devices) and ad placements.  See 
Compl. ¶ 22(a), (d). Google provides an advertising platform to businesses to help them sell 
their products—e.g., Nike can place ads on Google when a user searches for “running shoes.”  
But even as to ad placements, the Complaint fails to allege that these ad placements were sold 
to any users, or that any such sales occurred in Arizona and were thus subject to the ACFA.  
See id. ¶ 22(d); Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers of Am., 169 Ariz. 22, 28 (App. 1991) (“a 
state may not regulate conduct in another state that may be legal in that second state”).4 
3. The Complaint Does Not Allege Any Advertisement of 
Merchandise 
Similarly, the complaint fails to allege any “advertisements” of Google merchandise 
with any level of specificity.  The ACFA defines the term “advertisement” as any attempt by 
oral or written statements “to induce . . . any person to enter into any obligation or acquire 
any title or interest in any merchandise.”  A.R.S. § 44-1521(1).  In other words, there must be 
an affirmative statement to induce a purchase.  See id. 
Aside from the naked assertion that Google “advertises” its products in ad placements, 
Compl. ¶ 22, the AG makes little effort to identify actual public-facing advertisements made 
to induce purchases of these products or ad placements.  See Cullen, 218 Ariz. at 419 
(conclusory statements fail to meet even notice pleading standard).  Instead he dredges out-
of-context statements from Google’s help pages and privacy policies that have nothing to do 
with marketing merchandise to users.  Compl. ¶¶ 52, 80, 87, 129, Exs. 8, 36, 72.  Even further 
removed from the marketing of merchandise, the AG seeks to pass off as public 
advertisement material drawn from an internal draft of a slideshow marked “Confidential + 
Proprietary.”  Compl. ¶ 87, Ex. 239.5  Needless to say, this internal draft can hardly be 
                                                 
4 As discussed in greater detail in Part D.2, infra, the AG failed to show any deceptive 
or unfair conduct in connection with the sale of ads to merchants.  Any claim based on these 
sales of ad services would thus fail even if the AG alleged that any such sale occurred in 
Arizona and even if the merchants were considered “consumers.” 


































described as an “advertisement.”  See id.  The AG thus fails to identify any advertisement of 
merchandise with any level of particularity. 
B. There Is No Nexus Between the Alleged Misrepresentation and the Sale 
of Merchandise 
Consistent with its purpose to protect consumers against being induced into 
transactions on the basis of misrepresentations, the ACFA requires that any deceptive act or 
omission be “in connection with” the sale or purchase of merchandise.  A.R.S. § 44-1522.  
Courts have thus required that the alleged deception occur as “part of the bargaining process.”  
Rinehart v. GEICO, No. CV-19-01888-PHX-DLR, 2019 WL 6715190, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 10, 
2019).  Similarly, courts have dismissed claims predicated on statements concerning “actions 
taken on behalf of merchandise previously purchased.”  Contreras v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC,  No. 
2:16-cv-00302-MCE-EFB, 2019 WL 688198, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2019) (applying 
ACFA); accord Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp., 231 Ariz. 53, 60 (App. 2012) (subsequent 
purchasers of goods were not within scope of the ACFA), vacated in part on other grounds, 232 
Ariz. 344 (2013); Devore v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. CV-14-08063-PCT-DLR, 2015 WL 
12426151, at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2015). 
The AG largely ignores the nexus requirement, asserting in conclusory fashion that 
Google’s location-data practices are connected to the sale of merchandise because users 
purportedly consent to certain settings in their post-sale use of their devices. 
1. There Is No Misrepresentation Alleged in Connection with the 
Sale or Advertisement of a Nexus or Pixel Smartphone. 
As explained above, the only sale of merchandise that the AG has identified is the sale 
of Google’s Nexus and Pixel smartphones.  But despite the AG’s filing a 45-page complaint 
with over 1,200 pages of exhibits, there is not a single allegation explaining what false 
                                                                                                                                                              
has no relevance to Google’s public-facing statements as the AG suggests.  The AG’s choice 
to include this and a host of other internal documents is indicative of the AG’s bad-faith use 
of confidential material to improperly gain leverage over Google.  See People ex rel. Babbitt v. 
Herndon, 119 Ariz. 454, 456 (1978) (cautioning the AG from using ACFA cases “for an 



































statement Google made to consumers to induce them to purchase a Nexus or Pixel 
smartphone.  Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed. 
2. The Complaint Alleges Purportedly Deceptive Acts After a Sale 
Rather than identify any alleged deception in connection with the sale of a Nexus or 
Pixel smartphone, the AG focuses on statements relating to the Free Items, such as features 
of Android, Chrome and Google apps.  Because there is no allegation that the features of the 
Free Items were either sold or advertised, there can be no nexus to any such sale.  Indeed, 
only one of the Complaint’s 167 paragraphs concerns the relation of any purportedly 
deceptive act or practice to the sale of any merchandise, and it concerns only the sale of devices 
prior to any of the purported misstatements.  Compl. ¶ 22(b).  But even if the AG were to 
allege that the Free Items were “sold” as part of the Nexus and Pixel smartphones, the 
Complaint still states no nexus between any supposedly deceptive act and a sale because the 
alleged conduct occurred after the smartphones were sold.6  Specifically, Paragraph 22 
vaguely states that Google’s location practices are related to the sale of merchandise because 
users purportedly select certain location settings after purchasing them.  In other words, the 
AG does not even pretend that Google induced the purchase of its products or services 
through representations made or relied upon prior to a purchase.  That alone is a sufficient 
basis to dispose of the AG’s claim.  
Even under the AG’s convoluted theory, he cannot meet the “in connection with” 
requirement of the ACFA because the sole nexus between any alleged deceptive conduct 
relating to the Free Items and the sale or advertisement of smartphones must have occurred 
after the sale of the smartphones.  Indeed, not only does the alleged nexus occur only after a 
sale, but each and every one of the alleged deceptive practices concerns only forward-looking 
conduct that further attenuates any allegedly wrongful conduct from the “bargaining process.”  
                                                 
6 Should the AG contend that there was a separate “sale” of the Free Items, this 
separate sale is nowhere identified in the Complaint, nor is any deceptive or unfair conduct 


































Rinehart, 2019 WL 6715190, at *4; Contreras, 2019 WL 688198, at *4; Devore, 2015 WL 
12426151, at *8. 
• Location History:  The Location History service is off by default for new accounts 
and new devices, and only collects location data after the user has purchased and used 
her device, signed in to her Google account, and opted in to using the feature.  See 
Compl. ¶ 9. 
• Web & App Activity & Supplemental Web & App Activity:  WAA allegedly 
records user location data in connection with Google searches and limited app use 
after users purchase and begin to use their devices while signed in to their Google 
Account.  See Compl. ¶¶ 38, 161(n).  A second setting, sWAA, is nowhere alleged to 
collect location data.  See id. ¶¶ 38, 106 n.13. 
• WiFi Scanning and Connectivity:  WiFi settings, which the AG alleges are 
deceptive, may assist in inferring location of a user’s device based on proximity to 
access points known to Google—all after that user has purchased and set-up her 
phone.  Id. ¶¶ 71 n.7, 72. 
• App-level Permission:  The AG asserts that Google permits apps to share location 
data.  Compl. ¶¶ 79–86; id. ¶ 161(l).  Even if true, this theory requires that the user 
already have purchased and set up her phone, installed apps and selected permissions.  
Id. ¶¶ 79–86. 
• Location Master/Device Location:  The AG contends that the Location Master 
(GPS function) is misleading.  But even if it allowed Google to infer a user’s location, 
it would do so after she has bought and set up her phone, and connected to a known 
WiFi access point.  Id. ¶ 91. 
• System Updates:  The AG contends that Google’s system updates are misleading.  
Compl. ¶¶ 105–09; id. ¶ 161(f).  These allegations concern updates to pre-existing user 
devices or accounts; they have nothing to do with the purchase of any merchandise. 
• User Interface:  The AG alleges that Google altered location prompts and menu 


































These allegations concern conduct over a period of years to update the layout that 
users see and interface with when using devices after purchasing them.  See id. 
• Ad Personalization:  The AG contends that a user who opts out of Ad 
Personalization may nonetheless see ads based on her general location.  Compl. 
¶¶ 96–109, 161(p).  These allegations concern the user’s viewing of advertisements 
during her post-sale use of her device. 
Because each of these practices concern a user’s forward-looking conduct after 
purchasing a smartphone and after allegedly selecting settings, each is too far attenuated from 
the “bargaining process” to support a claim under the ACFA.7  See Rinehart, 2019 WL 
6715190, at *4; Contreras, 2019 WL 688198, at *4; Devore, 2015 WL 12426151, at *8; see also 
Walker v. Gallegos, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108 (D. Ariz. 2001) (dismissing ACFA claim based 
on post-sale conduct as “too attenuated from the underlying” sale). 
C. The AG Fails to Allege Intent to Support the “Omission” Claims 
To further give the appearance of substance, the AG duplicates nearly every allegation 
of a deceptive practice and repackages it in the guise of a “omission” claim.  Compl. ¶ 161(b), 
(c), (e), (g), (i), (k), (l), (m), (o), (q), (s).  For instance, the AG asserts that Google deceives 
users by continuing to collect location data with Location History turned off, then claims 
Google “conceals” that it continues to collect location data with Location History turned off.  
Compl. ¶ 161(a), (b).  The omission claims are thus largely duplicative and indistinct, but they 
suffer from an additional problem.  Specifically, nowhere does the AG allege with any 
specificity that Google omitted any material fact with the intent to induce reliance thereon, as 
is required for an omission claim under the ACFA.  See State ex rel. Horne v. AutoZone, Inc., 229 
Ariz. 358, 361 (2012).  The AG’s naked legal conclusion is insufficient.  See Compl. ¶ 160; 
Cullen, 218 Ariz. at 419.  Even had the AG alleged intent, any omission would still lack any 
nexus to the sale of merchandise, as discussed above. 
                                                 
7 In addition to these claims about things Google allegedly did, the AG also complains 



































D. Google’s Interactions with OEMs and Ad Purchasers Are Irrelevant 
The AG appears to contend that Google should be liable under the ACFA for its 
interactions with device manufacturers and vendors who purchase its ad services.  Compl. 
¶¶ 22, 161.  These are even further removed from a user’s purchase of any Google product 
and are too divorced from any sale of merchandise to support a claim.  Even assuming the 
AG had alleged any of the relevant conduct occurred in Arizona (he has not), see Bruce Church, 
169 Ariz. at 28, the claim would still fail. 
1. No ACFA claim can be asserted on behalf of OEMs 
“The clear intent of [the ACFA] is to protect unwary buyers from unscrupulous 
sellers.”  Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, Ltd., 971 F.2d 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1992).  
Here, the OEMs are neither alleged to be buyers nor targets of deceptive advertising, and 
thus no claim may be asserted on their behalf.  See id.; Vantage Mobility Int’l Inc. v. Kersey 
Mobility LLC, No. CV-19-04684-PHX-JJT, 2020 WL 411188, at *9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2020) 
(rejecting that the manufacturer of the product for sale could sue under ACFA).  The AG’s 
reliance on Google’s interactions with OEMs serves only to highlight the attenuation 
between the alleged deceptive conduct and any user’s purchase of merchandise.  As the AG 
alleges, the OEMs pre-install Android and many Google apps on their devices long before a 
user purchases the third-party device.  Compl. ¶¶ 29-30, 142; see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Amazon.com, No. CV-17-01994-PHX-JAT, 2018 WL 1536390, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018) 
(dismissing ACFA claim of subsequent purchaser of merchandise where deception occurred 
in prior transaction); In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 14-
CV-8317, 2017 WL 2664199, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2017) (downstream purchasers of 
goods have no claim under ACFA); In re Fluidmaster, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 940, 960–61 (N.D. 
Ill. 2016) (applying ACFA, noting that consumers who purchased home with defendant’s 
merchandise previously installed would have no claim under ACFA). 
2. There is no deceptive act alleged relating to ad purchasers. 
Not only does the complaint fail to identify a single deceptive statement made to 


































ad purchasers want location data, which makes the ad placement more valuable.  Even 
accepting —solely for purposes of this motion—the AG’s allegation that Google 
misrepresented its collection of user location data to users, no ad purchaser could have been 
deceived by that.  Buyers of ad placements have nothing to do with this action. 
E. The AG Ignores the Statute of Limitations. 
The Court should dismiss this action and require that the AG specify in any amended 
pleading what actions, if any, he alleges Google has taken within the applicable limitations 
period.   
A one-year statute of limitations applies to claims under the ACFA.  See A.R.S. § 12-
541(5); Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 234 Ariz. 125, 142 (App. 2014) (“A 
consumer fraud claim must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.”); 
Alaface v. Nat’l Inv. Co., 181 Ariz. 586, 591 (App. 1994) (“As a liability created by statute, a 
consumer fraud action must be initiated within one year after the cause of action accrues.”).  
The AG fails to identify what violations he contends have occurred within the last year.  
Instead, he presents a hodgepodge of disparate settings, functions and largely internal 
statements spanning over 10 years. 
The AG is likely to argue that this action is nonetheless timely because he has the right 
to initiate proceedings on behalf of the State, and his claim is therefore exempt from statutes 
of limitations.  See A.R.S. § 12-510 (“the state shall not be barred by the limitations of actions 
prescribed by this chapter.”).  While “there are occasions on which the Attorney General may 
initiate proceedings on behalf of the State, . . . these instances are dependent upon specific 
statutory grants of power.”  Ariz. State Land Dep’t v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 144 (1960).  Here, 
the ACFA lacks any statutory authorization for the AG to bring an action on behalf of the 
State.  See A.R.S. § 44-1528. 
The Legislature knows how to confer authority to act on behalf of the State; it has 
done so in many other statutes.  See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 12-2041 (permitting the AG to bring an 
action “in the name of the state upon his relation”); 35-212 (stating “the attorney general 


































the “the attorney general on behalf of the state” to take enforcement action).  When it 
enacted the ACFA, the Legislature only authorized the AG to act “on behalf of the state” in 
one instance: “if a court finds that any person has willfully violated” the ACFA, the AG may 
then petition the Court for civil penalties.  A.R.S. § 44-1531(A) (emphasis added).  But this 
provision does not, by its terms, authorize the AG to initiate an action.  That authority lies 
elsewhere in the ACFA, permitting the AG to bring an action for an injunction, but there is 
no language authorizing him to act on behalf of the State in doing so.  A.R.S. § 44-1528. 
The absence of such language from section 44-1528 was not inadvertent.  As 
originally enacted, section 44-1524 of the ACFA empowered the AG to investigate potential 
violations only upon receipt of a consumer’s verified complaint.  1967 Ariz. Sess. Laws 316 
(permitting AG investigation “[u]pon receipt of a verified written complaint”).  Only after 
such an investigation was the AG empowered to bring an action.  Id. at 318 (“Following an 
investigation made pursuant to 44-1524, . . . [he] may [bring an action in the superior court] . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, the AG sought to protect the interests of consumer complainants, 
not of the State.  And while the Legislature has since amended the statute to broaden the 
AG’s investigatory authority, see A.R.S. § 44-1524, it has never amended the remedial 
provision to authorize an action brought in the State’s name.  See A.R.S. § 44-1528. 
The Court should not permit the AG to rely on A.R.S. § 12-510 to excuse his 
undifferentiated presentation of events spanning over a decade.  The plain text of the ACFA 
confers upon him no authority to flout basic pleading standards by claiming the mantle of the 
State.  Like all other parties before the Court, the AG should be required to present the Court 
with a timely pleading that provides fair notice of his claims and permits fair review by the 
Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
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